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I.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Appeal is from a final order (Order Granting Defendant's Motion for

Summary Judgment) of the Third Judicial District Court of and for Salt Lake
County, State of Utah (Honorable L.A. Dever). Richard G. Fordham, the
plaintiff-appellant, appealed to this Court, which has jurisdiction pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(3)0). This Court, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-22(4), transferred this Appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals. After that court
affirmed the District Court order of summary judgment, Mr. Fordham petitioned
for a writ of certiorari. This Court granted that petition as to the following issue:
"Whether the court of appeals correctly adopted the 'professional rescuer
doctrine' and correctly delineated the rationales supporting it and its scope of
application." This Court now also has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§78-2-2(3)(a).
II.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
A.

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in determining that the

professional rescuer doctrine prohibits Mr. Fordham from pursuing his claim
against defendant-appellee Ryan Oldroyd and in, accordingly, affirming the
District Court's grant of summary judgment to Mr. Oldroyd.

1

(Standard of Review)
Summary judgment should be affirmed only if there is no genuine
dispute of material fact and only if the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. The appellate court reviews the trial court's legal conclusions
for correctness. E.g., Andreini v. Hultqren. 860 P.2d 916, 918 (Utah 1993).
The appellate court does not defer to the trial court's ruling on appeal of a
grant of summary judgment. E.g., Cannon v. University of Utah, 866 P.2d 586,
588 (Utah App. 1993). On review of a grant of summary judgment, the
appellate court views the facts, and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom,
in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Id. This Court accords no
deference to the Court of Appeals' legal analysis.
(Issue Preserved in District Court and Court of Appeals)
This issue was preserved in the district court by Mr. Fordham's
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (R.
88-126) and by his counsel's oral argument, presented on March 16, 2005, in
opposition to that Motion. This issue formed the basis for this Appeal and was
addressed in Mr. Fordham's Opening Brief and Reply Brief submitted to the
Court of Appeals.
B.

Whether this Court should correct the Court of Appeals' erroneous

and problematic analyses regarding duty and causation.
2

(Standard of Review)
This Court accords no deference to the Court of Appeals' legal analysis.
(Preservation of Issue)
Because the questions of duty and causation were never specifically at
issue in the District Court proceedings, Mr. Fordham can point to no specific
instance of preservation. He refers the Court to the Statement of Facts
appearing below at pp. 5-8. The Court of Appeals sua sponte included
discussions of "The Element of Duty" (ffif 19-22) and "The Element of
Causation" (fflj 23-27) in its opinion.
III.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS, AND
DISPOSITION IN THE DISTRICT COURT AND COURT OF
APPEALS

This Appeal, in this case that stems from an incident in which
Mr. Fordham, a Utah Highway Patrol Trooper, was severely injured, is from the
District Court's order granting Mr. Oldroyd's Motion for Summary Judgment
entered pursuant to the District Court's determination that the professional
rescuer doctrine, or "Fireman's Rule," prohibits Mr. Fordham from prevailing in
this litigation.
Mr. Fordham alleged, in his Complaint (R. 1-4), that Mr. Oldroyd was
negligent in connection with the subject incident of December 28, 2003 and
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that, as a proximate cause of Mr. Oldroyd's alleged negligence, Mr. Fordham
has sustained substantial compensable damages. Mr. Oldroyd in his Answer
(R. 7-12) denied those allegations. After limited discovery, including the taking
of the depositions of Mr. Oldroyd and Mr. Fordham, Mr. Oldroyd filed his
Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 39-40) and his Memorandum in support of
that Motion (R. 41-87). Mr. Fordham submitted his Memorandum in opposition
to that Motion (R. 88-126), along with a Request for Hearing and Oral
Argument (R. 127-28). Mr. Oldroyd then submitted his Reply Memorandum in
support of his Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 129-46).
Oral argument was held on Mr. Oldroyd's Motion for Summary
Judgment on March 16, 2005. At the conclusion of the hearing on
Mr. Oldroyd's Motion, the District Court, announcing its determination that the
Fireman's Rule prohibits Mr. Fordham from maintaining this action against
Mr. Oldroyd for injuries sustained when Mr. Fordham was struck by another
driver while he was at the scene of a rollover accident caused by Mr. Oldroyd's
negligence, from the bench orally granted Mr. Oldroyd's Motion. That ruling
was formalized by the District Court's Order Granting Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment (R. 163-64; a copy of that Order appears in the
Addendum hereto at 01-02).

4

This Appeal ensued. The Court of Appeals affirmed the grant of
Summary Judgment. A copy of its opinion is set forth in the Addendum hereto
at 03-15.
B.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

1.

On December 28, 2003, on the (eastbound) 600 South off-ramp

from 1-15, in Salt Lake City, Mr. Oldroyd allegedly operated a motor vehicle
negligently and in violation of his duty of care. R. 2; 41-42.
2.

Among other things, Mr. Oldroyd was allegedly driving too fast for

existing conditions (the roadway surface was snowy and/or icy), failed to
operate the vehicle he was operating within a single lane, and failed to keep
that vehicle under control. R. 2; 41-42. As alleged proximate results of
Mr. Oldroyd's subject negligence, Mr. Oldroyd lost control of his vehicle, that
vehicle traveled across the traffic lanes to its left, struck a snow bank on the
left (north) side of the roadway, overturned onto its top, and blocked the
northern-most off-ramp travel lane. R. 2.
3.

As alleged further proximate results of Mr. Oldroyd's subject

negligence, Mr. Fordham, who had been called to the scene, stopped his
Highway Patrol vehicle for traffic control and highway safety purposes, in the
immediate vicinity of the vehicle that Mr. Oldroyd had been operating, and was
in the process of getting flares out of the trunk of his vehicle when another
5

person operating another vehicle on the same off-ramp encountered ice and/or
snow on the roadway and lost control of that vehicle, and that vehicle struck
Mr. Fordham. R. 2-3; 42.
4.

As alleged further proximate results of Mr. Oldroyd's alleged

subject negligence, Mr. Fordham has sustained severe bodily injuries,
including a leg injury that nearly resulted in amputation; has sustained
substantial lost income and earning capacity; has sustained substantial
impairment and disability; has experienced substantial physical and emotional
pain and suffering; has sustained substantial disfigurement; has sustained
substantial loss of, and diminution of, enjoyment of various life activities; has
incurred substantial health care expenses; has sustained a substantial loss of
his pre-incident ability to provide household services; has sustained and
incurred additional "special" and "general" damages; and will, in the future,
sustain and incur substantial additional such damages, all to his damage in
compensable and reasonable amounts to be determined by the jury herein.
R. 3.
5.

Prior to filing this action, Mr. Fordham settled with the driver of the

vehicle that struck him for her liability insurance policy limits of $50,000.
6.

Mr. Fordham was also eligible for, and has received, workers

compensation benefits.
6

7.

Mr. Oldroyd has acknowledged that, as he came down the hill

from the off-ramp, he encountered "black ice," lost control momentarily, then
regained control, then lost control again, then slid, fishtailing across other
lanes of traffic, and his car then hit a snow bank piled up against the barrier on
the left (north) side of the road and flipped over. R. 156-57.
8.

Mr. Oldroyd saw the other vehicle striking Mr. Fordham. R. 158.

9.

It appeared to Mr. Oldroyd that the experience that the driver of

the vehicle that struck Mr. Fordham had with the roadway was not exactly like
his but similar to his, and he believes that the other driver encountered the
same problem on the roadway that he had encountered and that the other
driver's experience occurred within about one-half hour of the time that his
own rollover incident had occurred. R. 158-59.
10.

Mr. Oldroyd saw approximately five cars slipping or sliding on the

roadway between the time of his rollover incident and the time the driver
whose vehicle struck Mr. Fordham came along, and those cars seemed to
have about the same kind of initial reaction that his car had had at about the
same spots on the roadway. R. 159-60.
11.

Those other drivers were able to regain control of their vehicles

without coming clear across the roadway and striking the snow bank on the left
side and were able to regain control of their vehicles and keep going down the
7

hill, and there was a mix of SUVs and passenger cars among those vehicles.
R. 160.
12.

Mr. Oldroyd had encountered black ice and slush in his previous

driving experience and knew from his driving experience that, if one
encountered black ice or slush, there was a potential for one's losing control
and sliding and perhaps striking a snow bank and perhaps overturning and
perhaps losing control and hitting other vehicles or persons in the way. R.
160-61.
13.

It is Mr. Oldroyd's understanding that Mr. Fordham was among

the officers who arrived at the scene to investigate and assist with
Mr. Oldroyd's accident. R. 163.
14.

Mr. Oldroyd knew prior to the time of the subject incident that, if

he should lose control and get into an accident himself (a rollover or some
other kind), officers of the law would be coming to investigate and assist. R.
162.
15.

It was not Mr. Oldroyd but someone else (an occupant of a vehicle

that was already at the scene) who made the "911" call. R. 62-63.
IV.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Court of Appeals erroneously adopted the professional rescuer

doctrine, erroneously applied that doctrine to Mr. Fordham's claim, and
8

erroneously affirmed the District Court's grant of Summary Judgment to
Mr. Oldroyd.
The sole basis for Mr. Oldroyd's Motion for Summary Judgment and the
sole basis for the District Court's granting that Motion was the professional
rescuer doctrine, a common-law doctrine that, where accepted and applied to
facts such as those pertinent to this case, works to prohibit injured public
safety officers from prevailing in personal injury actions against those whose
negligence causes them to be, in the exercise of their job duties, at the scene
of incidents in which they are injured. The professional rescuer doctrine has
been accepted, to varying degrees and in various forms, by the courts of many
jurisdictions. It has also been rejected outright, or limited in its ambit, in ways
that would not prohibit Mr. Fordham from prevailing on his claim against
Mr. Oldroyd, by courts of other jurisdictions.
This Court should rule that the professional rescuer doctrine is at odds
with the Utah statutory scheme, unfairly discriminates against public safety
officers; and should not be deemed to be part of the common law of the State
of Utah. Alternatively, this Court should limit the ambit of the doctrine to its
original reach -- insulating private landowners from liability to firemen and
other "professional rescuers" who come to their property - and not apply it to
situations like this one.
9

This Court should, in any event, reverse the Court of Appeals and
remand this case for trial.
This Court should also correct parts of the Court of Appeals opinion
(dealing with duty and causation) that might otherwise cause considerable
confusion in Utah tort law.
V.

ARGUMENT
A.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ADOPTING THE
PROFESSIONAL RESCUER DOCTRINE AND IN
DETERMINING THAT THAT DOCTRINE PROHIBITS
MR. FORDHAM FROM PURSUING HIS CLAIMS AGAINST
MR.OLDROYD.

The "Fireman's Rule" is a widely rule recognized which, where it is
followed, prevents firefighters and police officers injured in the course of
their duties from recovering from those whose negligence proximately
caused their injuries or from the owner or occupant of premises who is
responsible for creating the condition requiring their presence on the
property. The Fireman's Rule has been applied to preclude recovery
against negligent motorists for injuries sustained by police officers which
were reasonably foreseeable in the course of their duties on the
highway. The rule is applicable where a police officer is responding to
or investigating an automobile accident and where an officer is injured
as a result of a motorist's actions in negligently stopping on a highway.
Am.Jur.2d Automobiles & Highway Traffic §691 (emphasis added). R. 43
(Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment).
The Court of Appeals acknowledged that this case "presents a difficult
issue with cogent arguments supporting both the rejection and the adoption of
the professional-rescuer doctrine in this state" fl[ 8 of Court of Appeals opinion)
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and that "it is a close question and Fordham raises valid considerations" fl| 13
of Court of Appeals opinion).
The Court of Appeals opinion states, at fl 8:
This case presents the first opportunity for any Utah appellate court to
consider whether, under Utah law, the professional-rescuer doctrine
operates to bar a police officer's claim for injuries against a driver,
whose alleged negligence caused the officer to be at the scene of an
accident, but where the officer's injuries were inflicted by the alleged
negligence of a third party.
After noting, in U 10 of its opinion, that the professional rescuer doctrine
"has been adopted by the vast majority of jurisdictions that have considered it,"
the Court of Appeals went on to explain, in If 11, that that doctrine has been
rejected by some jurisdictions and limited in its application by others. As
pointed out by the Court of Appeals, at fl 12, the South Carolina Supreme
Court, in Minnich v. Med-Waste. Inc., 564 S.E.2d 98,103 (S.C. 2002),
resolved the issue as follows:
In our view, the tort law of this state adequately addresses negligence
claims brought against non-employer tortfeasors arising out of injuries
incurred by firefighters and police officers during the discharge of their
duties. We are not persuaded by any of the various rationales
advanced by those courts that recognize the firefighter's rule. The more
sound public policy -- and the one we adopt -- is to decline to
promulgate a rule singling out police officers and firefighters for
discriminatory treatment.
(Emphasis added.)
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The professional rescuer doctrine was the sole basis for Mr. Oldroyd's
Motion for Summary Judgment and the sole basis on which the District Court
granted that Motion.
Given the similarities between Mr. Oldroyd's driving conduct and losing
control of his vehicle and the conduct and losing control of her vehicle of the
driver who struck Mr. Fordham, given such things as the short passage of time
between Mr. Oldroyd's conduct and that of the other driver, and given
Mr. Oldroyd's own acknowledgments (see Facts numbered 7-14, set forth at
pp. 7-8 above), there is, at a minimum, a question of fact as to whether
Mr. Oldroyd's alleged negligence, was a proximate cause1 of Mr. Fordham's
injuries and damages. Mr. Oldroyd apparently acknowledges the correctness
of that proposition, or else he would be expected to have contested it in his
Motion for Summary Judgment.
The Order Granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (R.
163-64), prepared by Mr. Oldroyd's counsel, states, in part:
Plaintiff, as a highway patrol trooper, acting in the course and scope of
his employment, cannot maintain a cause of action against Defendant
for injuries sustained when he was struck by another driver while at the
scene of a rollover accident caused by Defendant's negligence.
1

At TJ 5 of its opinion, the Court of Appeals stated, erroneously and perhaps
tellingly, that Mr. Fordham asserted that Mr. Oldroyd's alleged negligence was
the proximate case of Mr. Fordham's injuries. Mr. Fordham did not allege, and
has never contended, that Mr. Oldroyd's negligence was the sole proximate
cause of his injuries.

12

(Emphasis added.)
As with the question of Mr. Oldroyd's negligence, there is, at a minimum,
a triable question of fact as to the proximate cause connection between
Mr. Oldroyd's negligence and the injuries and damages sustained by
Mr. Fordham. Utah law is clear that an intervening negligent act (Mr. Fordham
does not dispute the proposition that the driver who struck him was negligent)
is not necessarily a superseding cause that relieves an original actor such as
Mr. Oldroyd of liability. This Court has clearly held, in Godeskv v. Provo City
Corp., 690 P.2d 541, 545 (Utah 1984):
The earlier actor is charged with the foreseeable negligent acts of
others. Therefore, if the intervening negligence is foreseeable, the
earlier negligent act is a concurring [not superseding] cause.
See, also, MUJI 3.16, and other cases there cited. It is also a matter of clearly
established Utah law that the negligence of two or more persons may combine
to produce an injury and that the negligence of two or more persons may be
proximate causes of the same injury, in which case the negligent persons must
share liability, for the subject injuries and damages, in proportion to their
individual percentages of negligence. See, e.g., MUJI 3.15 and cases there
cited.
It thus appears clear that, unless the Court of Appeals' determination
that the professional rescuer doctrine prohibits Mr. Fordham from maintaining
13

this action against Mr. Oldroyd is affirmed, Mr. Fordham should be allowed to
present his claim against Mr. Oldroyd to a jury, and that the jury should be
allowed to determine the respective percentages of causal fault of Mr. Oldroyd
and the driver whose vehicle struck Mr. Fordham, as well as the amounts of
Mr. Fordham's compensable damages.
One of the underpinnings of some cases relied on by Mr. Oldroyd in the
District Court proceedings is the notion that firefighters and police officers
"assume the risk" of injuries in connection with their employment.2 It is wellestablished, however, that, in Utah, assumption of risk is not an absolute
defense. E.g., Moore v. Burton Lumber & Hardware Co.. 631 P.2d 865, 86872 (Utah 1981). Furthermore, the basic philosophy of Utah tort law and the
Liability Reform Act of 1986, codified at Utah Code Ann. §§78-27-37 to -43, is
that each tortfeasor must pay his, her, or its fair share of a plaintiffs damages.
The Utah Legislature has made no exception to that rule of law for public
safety officers, and there is no good reason for this Court to adopt a common
law exception to that rule.

2

The District Court's Order from which this Appeal is taken concludes with this
language:
The Court finds that the type of risk which resulted in injury to
[Mr. Fordham] is precisely the type of risk [Mr. Fordham] was hired to
confront as a highway patrol trooper, and the "Fireman's Rule" therefore
precludes [Mr. Fordham's] claim of negligence against [Mr. Oldroyd].
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The Court of Appeals observed, in n. 1 of its opinion, (1) that
Mr. Fordham had collected policy limits ($50,000) from the insurance carrier of
the motorist whose vehicle struck him; and (2) that Mr. Fordham has received
workers compensation benefits. That first fact is of no particular significance.
With respect to that second fact, the Utah Legislature has determined that it is
permissible for one who receives workers compensation benefits to also
pursue a tort claim or claims against the person or persons whose negligence
has proximately caused the injured employee's injuries and damages. Utah
Code Ann. §34A-2-106 provides, in pertinent part:
(1)

When any injury or death for which compensation is payable
under this [workers compensation] chapter... is caused by the
wrongful act or neglect of a person other than an employer,
officer, agent, or employee of the employer:

(b)

the injured employee or the employee's heirs or personal
representative may have an action for damages against the
third person.

(Emphasis added.) There is no exception for fire or police officers injured in
the line of duty, and this Court should not leave standing a decision that
singles out firefighters and public safety officers, from the universe of private
and other public actors, for discriminatory treatment.

15

Furthermore, the basic philosophy of Utah tort law ana tne Liaomty
Reform Act of 1986, codified at Utah Code Ann. §§78-27-37 to -43, is that
each tortfeasor must pay his, her, or its fair share of a plaintiffs damages. The
Utah Legislature has made no exception to that rule of law for public safety
officers, and this Court should not leave standing a decision that adopts a
common law exception to that rule.
Cases from various jurisdictions have rejected the Fireman's Rule
outright or declined to apply it to situations like this. For example, in
Christensen v. Murphy. 678 P.2d 1210 (Or. 1984) (cited atfl 11 of the Court of
Appeals Opinion), the Oregon Supreme Court, in the course of reversing a
judgment in favor of the defendant, stated, after first explaining that the basis
for the professional rescuer doctrine had to do with assumption of risk:
Implied assumption of risk in both primary and secondary forms
statutorily has been abolished in this state since 1975, and thus it can
no longer serve as an absolute bar to a plaintiff's recovery. [Citations
omitted.] That fact requires us to reexamine the "fireman's rule" to
determine whether we can still hold that a fire fighter or police officer
assumes the risk of another's negligence to the point of absolutely
barring a public safety officer from recovering in a negligence action.

When we thus reexamine the "fireman's rule," we find that its major
theoretical underpinning is gone. Therefore, because the rule is not
sustainable under implied assumption of risk analysis, we must
determine if any other supportable theory under the general rubric of
"policy" will provide the foundation for the rule. The most often cited
policy considerations include: 1) To avoid placing too heavy a burden
16

on premises owners to keep their premises safe from unpredictable
entrance of firefighters; 2) To spread the risk of the fire fighters' injuries
to the public through workers' compensation, salary and fringe benefits;
3) To encourage the public to call for professional help and not rely on
self-help in emergency situations; 4) To avoid increased litigation....
[Citations omitted.]
Frequently, the so-called policy reasons are merely redraped arguments
drawn from premises liability or implied assumption of risk, neither of
which are now available as legal foundations in this state. For example,
policy consideration " 1 " above focuses on the fire fighter as a class from
whom the premises owner needs immunity (akin to a licensee or
trespasser), not on the reasonableness of the activity of the premises
owner in the circumstances....
The remaining policy arguments are equally flawed. The weakness in
the loss-spreading rationale, "2" above, is obvious. By denying a public
safety officer recovery from a negligent tortfeasor, the officer is not
directed to recover his damages from the general public; rather the
officer is totally precluded from recovering these damages from anyone.
Contrast this with other public employees who are injured when
confronting dangers on their jobs. The latter can recover workers'
compensation and salary benefits from the public, but are also allowed
additional tort damages from the third-party tort-feasors. Under the
"fireman's rule" the injured public safety officer must bear a loss which
other public employees are not reguire to bear....
As for "3" above, Dean Prosser criticized as "preposterous rubbish" the
argument offered to defend the "fireman's rule" that tort liability might
deter landowners from uttering cries of distress in emergency situations.
[Citations omitted.] We agree. Furthermore we have previously
rejected "4" above, avoidance of increased litigation, as a ground for
denying substantive liability. [Citations omitted.]
As a result of statutory abolition of implied assumption of risk, we hold
that the "fireman's rule" is abolished in Oregon as a rule of law and no
longer can bar recovery of damages for personal injuries sustained by a
public safety officer, in the course of his or her employment, as a result
of a defendant's negligent conduct.

17

Id. at 1216-18 (emphasis added).
In Banyai v. Arruda. 799 P.2d 441 (Colo. App. 1990), the Colorado
Court of Appeals, in the course of reversing the dismissal of a police officer's
claim against a driver whose negligence caused a collision and caused the
officer to be present at the scene, where the officer's vehicle was rearended by
other drivers, explained:
We do not view employment as a firefighter or police officer as legal
acceptance of the negligence of others who expose the officer to injury
in connection with an automobile accident. This is especially so when
consideration is given to the fact that other public employees, like
citizens in general, remain entitled to assert their claims.

While the officer's special skills, training, and experience may be
considered with reference to any comparative negligence involved, in
our view, a per se grant of immunity to those whose negligence creates
a dangerous situation for the officer is an unwarranted departure from
the general duty imposed to exercise due care for the safety of others.
[Citation omitted.] Thus, we hold that a duty existed in this case for the
drivers to exercise due care towards Banyai consistent with the law of
negligence as applied in this state.
Id. at 443 (emphasis added).
See, also, the wise and eloquent analysis of the court in Minnich v. MedWaste. Inc.. 564 S.E.2d 98, 103 (S.C. 2002), quoted by the Court of Appeals
and appearing at p. 11, above.
Courts of other states have declined to apply the professional rescuer
doctrine to situations other than those that originally gave rise to the rule
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(those in which injured firemen sought to obtain tort recovery from those to
whose premises they were summoned in emergency situations and
subsequently injured). In Lave v. Neumann, 317 N.W.2d 779 (Neb. 1982)
(cited at ^ 11 of the Court of Appeals opinion), the plaintiff, a policeman, was
injured when he ran after a truck that had started moving after having been
negligently left on the street by the defendant. The Nebraska Supreme Court
held, in the course of affirming a judgment in favor of the plaintiff:
The reasons which justify the application of the fireman's rule in cases
where firemen were injured in fires involving personal property are the
same reasons which support the rule in fires involving real property. A
similar analogy cannot be made as to policemen injured while
performing their duty not on private premises.

We see no reason why, under the facts of this case, a policeman injured
in the performance of his duty, by the negligence of another, has any
less right to be compensated for his injuries than a person not a
policeman.
Id. at 782 (emphasis added).
In Levandoski v. Cone, 841 A.2d 208 (Conn. 2004) (also cited at fl 11 of
the Court of Appeals opinion), the Connecticut Supreme Court held, in the
course of affirming a judgment in favor of the plaintiff:
The common-law "firefighter's rule" provides, in general terms, that a
firefighter or police officer who enters private property in the exercise of
his duties occupies the status of a licensee and, therefore, is owed a
duty of care by the property owner that is less than that owed to an
ordinary invitee. [Citations omitted.] Thus, under the firefighter's rule,
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the landowner generally owes the firefighter or police officer injured on
his property "only the duty not to injure him willfully or wantonly ...." The
principle issue in this appeal is whether the firefighter's rule should be
extended beyond the scope of premises liability so as to bar a police
officer from recovering, based on a claim of ordinary negligence, from a
tortfeasor who is neither an owner nor a person in control of the
premises. The defendant, who is not a landowner or a person in control
of land, appeals from the judgment of the trial court, following a jury trial,
in favor of the plaintiff, a police officer who was injured by the
defendant's negligent conduct on the land of another person. We
conclude that the firefighter's rule should not be so extended and,
accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court in favor of the
plaintiff.
Id. at 209 (emphasis added).
Mr. Fordham was injured when he was struck by a vehicle on a public
highway and not while he was fighting a fire or responding to a fire or other
incident on Mr. Oldroyd's property. The hoariest basis for invocation of the
professional rescuer doctrine is thus clearly lacking in this case.
It may also be worth noting that the jurisdictions that apply the
professional rescuer doctrine implicitly or expressly make a distinction
between those whose negligence creates the situation to which fire or police
officers respond and those whose negligence (like that of the driver who struck
Mr. Fordham) is the more immediate cause of harm. 3 If the doctrine is
consistently applied, based on its supposed policy underpinnings such as

3

The Court of Appeals expressly ruled, at fl 31 of its opinion, that the
professional rescuer doctrine does not bar a public safety officer's claim
against one whose negligence occurs after the officer arrives at the scene.
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assumption of risk, the officers' working for all the taxpayers, and the
proposition that workers compensation benefits are, in any event, available to
public safety officers injured on the job, there should be no such distinction;
and the doctrine should, if it is applied consistently, work to prohibit public
safety officers from suing anyone for any injuries negligently inflicted on them
in the course of their job duties. And yet no court seems to hew to the
proposition that a police officer such as Mr. Fordham is unable to proceed
against a person who (like the driver who struck Mr. Fordham) negligently
injures him after he arrives at the scene to assist in a situation caused by an
earlier negligent actor such as Mr. Oldroyd. This is so although, when one
considers the concept of creation of risk and how broadly and in how many
differing situations that concept is addressed in Utah tort law, there is no
meaningful distinction between the risk created by someone who negligently
sets up a potentially dangerous situation and the person whose negligence is
the more immediate cause of the injury. A public safety officer risks his or her
safety, as an inherent part of his or her job, is paid by the taxpayers, and may
recover workers compensation benefits, regardless of whether he or she is
injured by the person whose negligence occasions his or her presence, the
negligence of the person whose vehicle strikes him or her, or a combination of
both.
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The professional rescuer doctrine did not prohibit Mr. Fordham from
pursuing his claim against the driver who struck him even though one of the
risks of his employment was that he might be struck by such a person. And
yet the doctrine, as adopted and applied by the Court of Appeals, works to
prohibit Mr. Fordham from pursuing his claim against Mr. Oldroyd. That
inconsistency appears to constitute another problem with the putative wisdom
of the Rule.
The author of Note: Has the Michigan Firefighter's Rule Gone up in
Smoke? An Analysis of the Wilful and Wanton Exception. 44 Wayne L. Rev.
1555, 1572-77 (Fall 1998), wrote:
It is unjust to assign firefighters and police officers, officials who risk
their lives to protect the public, to a status less than that of every other
citizen. In essence, the courts are creating individualized duties of care
based on occupational status, a practice that no Michigan court
expressly condones.
Further defects in the policy argument are seen in the inadequacy and
harmful effects that can result from forcing police officers and firefighters
to rely solely on workers' compensation. The courts have immunized
tortfeasors from liability arising from their negligent misconduct by
limiting safety officials to statutory recovery. This in turn fosters
negligent behavior. People have no incentive to take proper precautions
for fire prevention and criminals are afforded a greater degree of
recklessness. While negligent citizens are being provided immunity,
injured officers are being deprived adequate recovery as workers'
compensation is generally inferior to a tort recovery.
The notion that workers' compensation will best spread the cost of
officers' injuries to the public as a whole is also a fallacy. Since
taxpayers provide funds for the worker's compensation benefits that pay
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injured officers, the system requires citizens who act non-negligently to
pay for the misconduct of other citizens. The firefighter's rule forces the
individual safety officer and the non-negligent citizen to unfairly shoulder
this burden. Allowing safety officials to pursue third-party tort claims
would alleviate this burden and would allow worker's compensation
insurers the right of subrogation to any proceeds from a third-party
award, reducing overall taxpayer expenses.

The analysis is simple. Courts will merely apply general principles of
negligence in determining whether recovery should be permitted to a
particular public safety officer. Fundamental concepts of duty, breach,
causation, and damages will determine liability instead of the current
complicated and ambiguous exceptions. The trier of fact will consider
whether "a defendant breached a legal duty owed to the plaintiff," and
whether that breach was the actual and proximate cause of the plaintiff's
injuries. Where a plaintiff fails to act reasonably under the
circumstances, the general principles of comparative negligence will
diminish the recovery. This system, grounded in familiar legal theories
in which attorneys and courts are well-versed, will grant the greatest
assurances of safety, cost prevention, efficiency and justice. Such a
system will give firefighters and police officers a chance to recover the
rights and privileges that a poorly conceived and poorly executed rule of
law has stolen.
This Court should determine that no public policy consideration relied on
by the Court of Appeals is more important than the public policy consideration,
recognized by the South Carolina Supreme in Minnich (quoted at p. 11, above)
that fire and police officers (who risk their lives on a regular basis for a not
particularly handsome salary) should not be subjected to discriminatory
treatment.
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B.

THIS COURT SHOULD CORRECT PARTS OF THE COURT
OF APPEALS DECISION (DEALING WITH DUTY AND
CAUSATION) THAT MIGHT OTHERWISE CAUSE
CONSIDERABLE CONFUSION IN UTAH TORT LAW.

The Court of Appeals sua sponte (Mr. Oldroyd made no such argument)
concluded, on the purported basis of Hale v. Beckstead, 2005 UT 24, 116 P.3d
263, a decision of this Court that deals with the "open and obvious" doctrine of
premises liability law, that "the doctrine of assumption of risk is a duty-defining
role under the facts of this case." Court of Appeals opinion at ^ 22. The Court
of Appeals so concluded in the face of this Court's clear pronouncement in
Hale, at ffij 21-23 (116 P.3d at 268), that assumption of risk is an affirmative
defense and not something that is subject to a duty-defining analysis.
Mr. Fordham acknowledges that where there is no duty there can be no
breach of any supposed duty and no tort recovery, but he urges this Court to
explain that its decision in Hale was not intended to reach beyond the
premises liability context in which it was decided, or to close the door to
potential recovery by other classes of tort plaintiffs; and to make it clear that
motorists owe a duty to all, including public safety officers, who are
foreseeably (as a matter for the trier of fact to determine) injured as proximate
results of motorists' negligence.
Similarly, this Court should clarify that a long-established aspect of Utah
proximate causation law has not been changed by the Court of Appeals
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opinion. At ffif 23 through 27, and n. 3, of its opinion, the Court of Appeals
strains to make this case fit under the same analytical framework as Steiner
Corp. v. Johnson & Hiqqins of California. 2000 UT 21. 996 P.2d 531. ln1J26,
the Court of Appeals states:
The Steiner II court concluded that the element of causation could not
be established where the negligence of the plaintiff occurred before the
professional was engaged:
[W]e conclude that a pre-existing condition that a professional is
called upon to resolve cannot be the cause, either proximate or
direct, of the professional's failure to exercise an appropriate
standard of care in fulfilling his duties. To avoid otherwise would
allow professionals to avoid responsibility for the very duties they
undertake to perform. A doctor, for example, might be able to
avoid liability for negligently treating an injured person because
the patient negligently had run a traffic light and was injured.
Such a result would be clearly unsound.
(Emphasis added.) The Court of Appeals then remarkably, sua sponte
(Mr. Oldroyd made no such argument), proceeded to state, in paragraph 27 of
its opinion:
Because the acts of Steiner [the plaintiff[ preceded the engagement of J
& H [the professional], the Steiner II court [this Court] held that it did not
relate to the injury.... Without such a causal connection the plaintiffs
prior negligence could not be considered under Utah's comparative fault
analysis.... The causation element here is also affected by the
sequence of events. While it is true that "but for" Oldroyd's accident
Fordham would not have been present at the scene, the direct cause of
his injuries was a separate and subsequent act of a third party.
(Emphasis added.)
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That observation appears to be clearly at odds with the rule laid down by
this Court in Godeskv v. Provo City Corp.. 690 P.2d 541 (Utah 1984), a case
cited by Mr. Fordham in his opening Court of Appeals Brief:
An intervening negligent act does not automatically become a
superseding cause that relieves the earlier actor of liability. The earlier
actor is charged with the foreseeable negligent acts of others.
Therefore, if the intervening negligence is foreseeable, the earlier
negligent act is a concurring [not superseding] cause.
Id. at 545.
The Court of Appeals seems to have been reaching, and in that exercise
reached for Steiner, a case that is analytically decidedly different from this one
and that deals, unlike this one, with the very raison d'etre for the involvement
of professionals in the affairs of plaintiffs. Left standing, the Court of Appeals
opinion might well cause trial judges erroneously, even in the face of the
established proposition that it is only unforeseeable acts that break the chain
of causation,4 summarily to dismiss claims of tort plaintiffs. This Court should
recognize that possibility and explain that the causation analysis of the Court
of Appeals opinion is erroneous.

4

As explained above (see Facts 7-14, pp. 7-8 above), Mr. Oldroyd has
through his deposition testimony himself essentially acknowledged the
foreseeability aspect of Mr. Fordham's proximate causation contention.
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VI.

CONCLUSION
The professional rescuer doctrine is at odds with the principle at the

heart of Utah tort law that each tortfeasor should bear his, her, or its fair share
of responsibility, as determined by a jury, for damages his, her, or its
negligence has proximately caused another to sustain. Also, adoption of that
doctrine by this Court would amount to unfair discrimination against Utah
public safety officers, for the doctrine does not apply to private persons and it
does not apply to other public employees. Nor do the various reasons offered
in support of the doctrine appear to hold water. Assumption of the risk is not
an absolute defense but should be viewed under the umbrella of comparative
fault. The fact that Mr. Fordham, like other public safety officers injured in the
course of their job duties, is paid by the taxpayers and the fact that he has
received workers compensation benefits have no pertinent legal significance.
Furthermore, the doctrine's prohibition of claims against those whose
negligence causes peace officers to be at scenes where they are injured but
non-prohibition of claims against those whose negligence more directly causes
injury is illustrative of its logical weakness.
This Court should rule (for reasons such as those articulated by the
courts in Minnich (p. 11 above), Christensen (pp. 16-17), and Banvai (p. 18),
that there is no need or good public policy reason for any aspect of the
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professional rescuer doctrine to be made part of Utah common law.
Alternatively, the Court should decline to apply the doctrine to the facts of this
case and rule (similar to the holdings of the Lave and Levandoski cases
discussed at pp. 19-20, above) that Mr. Fordham may proceed with his claim
against Mr. Oldroyd.
This Court should, in any event, reverse the Court of Appeals opinion
and the Summary Judgment so that this case may proceed to trial and so that
the jury may decide questions that jurors typically decide in personal injury
negligence actions (including, if Mr. Oldroyd cares to pursue such a
contention, and if there is sufficient evidence to support such a contention,
Mr. Fordham's own supposed negligence in doing what he was doing).
This Court should also, in the course of addressing the Court of
Appeals' duty and causation analyses, explain that Hale should not be
extended beyond its premises liability context; that the rule of Godeskv is still
alive and well; and that the pertinent rule of Steiner is limited to the concept it
discusses: that professionals should not be able to lay fault off on those who
hire them for those persons' own antecedent negligence.
Regarding the specific issue concerning which the Court granted
certiorari: this Court should determine (1) that the Court of Appeals did not
correctly adopt the professional rescuer doctrine; (2) that the Court of Appeals
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did not correctly delineate the rationales supporting that doctrine (if its
discussion of "The Element of Duty" and "The Element of Causation"
constitutes such delineation); and (3) that the Court of Appeals did not
correctly delineate the scope of application of that doctrine (assuming that the
doctrine is ever to be applied by the courts of this State and if the Court of
Appeals' application of the doctrine to Mr. Fordham's situation -- as opposed to
situations to which the doctrine traces its origins and/or situations in which the
alleged tortfeasor is the one who calls for help -- is what this Court had in mind
with respect to that part of its grant of certiorari).
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

RICHARD G. FORDHAM,
Plaintiff,

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

vs.
RYAN OLDROYD,
Defendant.

Case No. 040910717 PI
Judge L.A. Dever

THE COURT, having considered Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment,
dated January 7, 2005, together with memoranda submitted by counsel for all parties,
and the Court having entertained oral argument on the motion, hereby ORDERS that
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. The Court finds that
summary judgment is appropriate pursuant to the provisions of the "Fireman's Rule".
Plaintiff, as a highway patrol trooper, acting in the course and scope of his
employment, cannot maintain a cause of action against Defendant for injuries
sustained when he was struck by another driver while at the scene of a rollover
accident caused by Defendant's negligence. The Court finds that the type of risk

which resulted in injury to the Plaintiff is precisely the type of risk Plaintiff was hired
to confront as a highway patrol trooper, and the "Fireman's Rule" therefore precludes
Plaintiff's claim of negligence against Defendant.
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McHUGH, Judge:
\l
Richard G, Fordham appeals the trial courtrs grant of Ryan
Oldroyd's motion for summary judgment. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
%2
"When reviewing a district court's grant of summary
judgment, we view the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn
therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party,
here, the plaintiff. We recite the facts of this case
accordingly." Wayment v. Clear Channel Broad., Inc., 2005 UT
25, ^|3, 116 P. 3d 271 (quotations and citation omitted).
%3 On December 28, 2003, Oldroyd was involved in a single-car
accident on a freeway off-ramp in Salt Lake City, Utah. The
accident was the result of Oldroyd*s alleged negligent operation
of his vehicle when he encountered snowy and/or icy road
conditions on the freeway.
K4
Several Utah Highway Patrol troopers, including Fordham,
responded to Oldroyd1s accident. When Fordham arrived at the
scene, he positioned and stopped his vehicle for purposes of

traffic control and highway safety. Fordham then walked to the
rear of his vehicle to retrieve flares, which he intended to use
to warn approaching drivers of the accident. While Fordham was
retrieving the flares from the trunk of his vehicle, an
approaching driver lost control of her automobile, allegedly in a
negligent manner, when she encountered snowy and/or icy road
conditions on the freeway, and struck Fordham. As a result,
Fordham sustained substantial bodily injuries.
15
In May 2004, Fordham initiated this action against Oldroyd,
asserting that Oldroyd's alleged negligence was the proximate
cause of his injuries and seeking to recover damages.1 After
limited discovery, Oldroyd filed a motion for summary judgment,
arguing that the "fireman's rule"2 precludes Fordham's negligence
claim against Oldroyd. After oral argument, the trial court
granted Oldroyd's motion. Fordham appeals.
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
%6
Fordham asserts that the trial court erred by granting
Oldroyd's motion for summary judgment based on its conclusion
that the professional-rescuer doctrine precludes Fordham's
negligence claim against Oldroyd. Summary judgment is
appropriate only when "there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c).
"Because
summary judgment presents only questions of law, we give no
deference to the district court's legal decisions and review them
for correctness." Fericks v. Lucy Ann Soffe Trust, 2004 UT
85,HlO, 100 P.3d 1200.

1

Prior to filing this action against Oldroyd, Fordham
settled with the driver of the vehicle that struck him for her
insurance policy limits of $50,000. In addition, Fordham was
eligible for, and has received, workers' compensation benefits.
2

Although we prefer to refer to this doctrine as the
"professional-rescuer doctrine," other jurisdictions have used
numerous terms to describe it, including the "fireman's rule,"
the "firefighter's rule," and the "public safety officer's rule."
Accordingly, in this opinion, we may refer to the doctrine by any
of the aforementioned terms, particularly when discussing the
approaches taken by other jurisdictions.
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ANALYSIS
if"7
In challenging the trial court's grant of Oldroyd's motion
for summary judgment, Fordham does not contend that there is a
"genuine issue as to any material fact." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c).
Rather, Fordham argues that the trial court erred by ruling that
Oldroyd was "entitled to a judgment as a matter of law," id. ,
based upon its conclusion that the professional-rescuer doctrine
bars Fordham's negligence claim against Oldroyd.
I.

The Professional-Rescuer Doctrine

1f8
This case presents the first opportunity for any Utah
appellate court to consider whether, under Utah law, the
professional-rescuer doctrine operates to bar a police officer's
claim for injuries against a driver, whose alleged negligence
caused the officer to be at the scene of an accident, but where
the officer's injuries were inflicted by the alleged negligence
of a third party. This case presents a difficult issue with
cogent arguments supporting both the rejection and the adoption
of the rule in this state. After carefully considering this
issue, we agree with the trial court that, as matter of public
policy and as limited to the facts of this case, Utah should join
the majority of states that have adopted the professional-rescuer
doctrine.
f9
Under the professional-rescuer doctrine, "a professional
rescuer ordinarily cannot recover damages for injuries sustained,
while responding to an emergency, from the person who negligently
created the crisis." 25 Vincent Robert Johnson, Personal Injury,
Rescuers and the Duty to Act § 1.07[1] (Louis R. Frumer & Melvin
I. Friedman eds., 2004) (footnotes omitted); see also 57B Am.
Jur. 2d Negligence § 782 (2004).
flO For over a century, this rule has been adopted by the vast
majority of jurisdictions that have considered it. The Alaska
Supreme Court recently noted: "Nearly all of the courts that
have considered whether or not to adopt the [f]irefighter's
[r]ule have in fact adopted it." Moody v. Delta W., Inc., 3 8
P.3d 1139, 1140-41 (Alaska 2002) (stating that at the time the
decision was issued, only one state had rejected the rule, while
the overwhelming majority of states that had considered the rule
had adopted it, but also noting that the rule had been abolished
or limited by statute in several states). "The broad, albeit not
unanimous, endorsement by the courts of the fireman's [rule]
suggests that the rule is sound." Johnson, supra, § 1.07[2]
(footnote omitted); see also 8 Am. Jur. 2d Automobiles & Highway
Traffic § 691 (1997) (noting that the fireman's rule is "widely
recognized"). Although it "has been criticized by some authors
and judges, it is undeniably true . . . that almost all
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jurisdictions confronting this issue have adopted some form of
the fireman's rule." Pottebaum v. Hinds, 347 N.W.2d 642, 643-44
(Iowa 1984) (citations omitted).
Kll Notwithstanding its broad acceptance by courts that have
considered it, the professional-rescuer doctrine has been
rejected by some jurisdictions. See, e.g., Christensen v.
Murphy, 678 P.2d 1210, 1218 (Or. 1984) (abolishing doctrine on
grounds that supporting policy arguments were flawed and Oregon
had abolished assumption of risk by passing comparative
negligence statute); Minnich v. Med-Waste, Inc., 564 S.E.2d 98,
103 (S.C. 2002) (declining to adopt doctrine because the court
was "not persuaded by any of the various rationales advanced by
those courts that recognize the firefighter's rule"). In
addition, its application has been limited by other courts. See,
e.g., Levandoski v. Cone, 841 A.2d 208, 216 (Conn. 2004)
(refusing to extend doctrine beyond premises liability); Court v.
Grzelinski, 379 N.E.2d 281, 285 (111. 1978) (same); Lave v.
Neumann, 317 N.W.2d 779, 782 (Neb. 1982) (refusing to extend
doctrine to police officer on public property).
1(12 Fordham argues that the rule unfairly discriminates against
police officers and firefighters, while other public employees
are free to sue any persons that might have contributed to an
injury inflicted upon those employees during the performance of
their duties. The South Carolina Supreme Court adopted similar
reasoning in rejecting the professional-rescuer doctrine in
Minnich:
In our view, the tort law of this state
adequately addresses negligence claims
brought against non-employer tortfeasors
arising out of injuries incurred by
firefighters and police officers during the
discharge of their duties. We are not
persuaded by any of the various rationales
advanced by those courts that recognize the
firefighter's rule. The more sound public
policy—and the one we adopt — is to decline
to promulgate a rule singling out police
officers and firefighters for discriminatory
treatment.
564 S.E.2d at 103.
fl3 Although it is a close question and Fordham raises valid
considerations, we are persuaded that public policy weighs in
favor of adopting the professional-rescuer doctrine in Utah.
Furthermore, we believe that application of the rule is
consistent with the existing tort law of this state.
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II.

Rationale for the Professional-Rescuer Doctrine

Ul4 The historic underpinnings of the doctrine can be found in
decisions addressing traditional concepts of premises liability.
"Since a policeman or fireman was privileged to enter land
pursuant to his public duties and could come on property any
place or time, courts classified them as bare licensees and held
the only duty owed these public servants was to not wantonly or
willfully injure them." Pottebaum, 347 N.W.2d at 644; see also
Waggoner v. Troutman Oil Co., 894 S.W.2d 913, 915 (Ark. 1995)
(adopting doctrine and recognizing licensee origin); Walters v.
Sloan, 571 P.2d 609, 611 (Cal. 1977) (reaffirming doctrine and
recognizing licensee origin); Levandoski, 841 A.2d at 216
(refusing to extend doctrine beyond its historical use in
premises liability cases); Minnich# 564 S.E.2d at 100 (rejecting
doctrine and citing Gibson v. Leonard, 32 N.E. 182 (111. 1892),
as the first case to hold that a firefighter entering private
property in performance of his job duties is a licensee).
Although "[s]ome jurisdictions still rely on this rationale to
limit liability to public safety officials," Pottebaum, 347
N.W.2d at 644 (citing cases using this rationale), modern
decisions have based application of the doctrine on a series of
justifications that are not dependent on the professional
rescuer's status as a licensee.
^15 One reason offered for the doctrine is the principle of
assumption of risk. Courts relying on this rationale "bar
recovery for damages caused to policemen or firefighters from
those risks that are inherent in their jobs." Id. at 645 (citing
cases relying upon assumption of risk); see also Neighbarger v.
Irwin Indus., Inc., 882 P.2d 347, 352 (Cal. 1994) (stating that
doctrine is "an example of the proper application of the
[principle] of assumption of .risk"); Steelman v. Lind, 634 P.2d
666t 667 (Nev. 1981) (holding that a highway patrol officer
"cannot base a tort claim upon damage caused by the very risk
that he is paid to encounter and with which he is trained to
cope").
1l6 In Levandoski, the Connecticut Supreme Court refused to
extend the doctrine beyond premises liability cases, in part, on
the grounds that assumption of risk had been eliminated by the
Connecticut Legislature's adoption of comparative negligence.
See 841 A.2d at 214-15; see also Christensen v. Murphy, 678 P.2d
1210, 1216-17 (Or. 1984) (holding that doctrine was not
sustainable after abolishment of assumption of risk as a defense
by Oregon Legislature). As in Oregon and Connecticut, assumption
of risk "is no longer recognized in Utah as a total bar to
recovery." Hale v. Beckstead, 2005 UT 24,1(21, 116 P.3d 263; see
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-38 (2002) . Thus, adoption of the
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professional-rescuer doctrine in Utah cannot be supported by a
rationale based upon a theory of assumption of risk.
Kl7 Assumption of risk, however, is not the only justification
courts have cited as support for the professional-rescuer
doctrine. Some jurisdictions have relied in large part on public
policy considerations. See, e.g., Waggoner. 894 S.W.2d at 915
(adopting doctrine); Walters. 571 P.2d at 612 (reaffirming
doctrine and finding it was supported by "public policy" and
"fundamental concepts of justice"); Thomas v. Pang. 811 P.2d 821,
825 (Haw. 1991) ("[I]t offends public policy to say that a
citizen invites private liability merely because he happens to
create a need for those public services." (alteration in
original) (quotations and citation omitted)); Pottebaum. 347
N.W.2d at 645 (citing cases relying on public policy).
118 In Moody v. Delta Western. Inc.. 38 P.3d 1139 (Alaska 2002),
the Alaska Supreme Court adopted the professional-rescuer
doctrine, stating:
"There is at work here a public policy
component that strongly opposes the notion
that an act of ordinary negligence would
expose the actor to liability for injuries
sustained in the course of a public servant's
performance of necessary, albeit hazardous,
public duties. In absence of a legislative
expression of contrary policy, a citizen
should not have to run the risk of a civil
judgment against him for negligent acts that
occasion the presence of a firefighter at the
scene of a carelessly set fire or of a police
officer at a disturbance or unlawful incident
resulting from negligent conduct."
Id. at 1141 (quoting Berko v. Freda. 459 A.2d 663, 667 (N.J.
1983)). We are persuaded that the doctrine, as applied to the
facts before us, is consistent with public policy and not
inconsistent with any legislative pronouncement to the contrary,
despite Utah's adoption of comparative fault. See Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-27-38.
III.

The Element of Duty

iil9 To recover for negligence, Fordham must establish that: (1)
Oldroyd owed Fordham a duty of care, (2) Oldroyd breached that
duty, (3) Oldroyd's breach of the duty was the proximate cause of
Fordham's injuries, and (4) Fordham actually suffered injuries or
damage. See Webb v. University of Utah. 2005 UT 80,119, 125 P.3d
906. Rather than introducing a new concept into tort law, the
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professional-rescuer doctrine recognizes a failure of an
essential element of a claim for negligence. The rule bars the
rescuer's recovery "for the very valid public policy reason that
the party or parties who negligently started the fire had no
legal duty to protect the firefighter from the very danger that
the firefighter was employed to confront." Waggoner, 894 S.W.2d
at 915 (adopting rule).
f20 In one of the earliest cases to adopt the professionalrescuer doctrine, Justice Weintraub of the New Jersey Supreme
Court explained the absence of the duty element of negligence,
stating:
In terms of duty, it may be said there is
none owed the fireman to exercise care so as
not to require the special services for which
he is trained and paid. Probably most fires
are attributable to negligence, and in the
final analysis the policy decision is that it
would be too burdensome to charge all who
carelessly cause or fail to prevent fires
with the injuries suffered by the expert
retained with public funds to deal with those
inevitable, although negligently created,
occurrences. Hence, for that risk, the
fireman should receive appropriate
compensation from the public he serves, both
in pay which reflects the hazard and in
workmen's compensation benefits for the
consequences of the inherent risks of the
calling.
Krauth v. Geller, 157 A.2d 129, 131 (N.J. 1960); see also Kelly
v. Ely, 764 A.2d 1031, 1034-35 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001)
(reaffirming Krauth after statutory limitation of the rule and
stating that "[i]n our view, the statute [limiting the rule] was
intended to . . . afford protection to a firefighter injured as a
result of negligence unrelated to and independent of, the onset
of the fire"). We agree with New Jersey's application of the
rule to bar claims against the party whose alleged negligence
caused the need for the services of the rescuer, but was not the
direct cause of the rescuer's injury.
1f2l Furthermore, narrowly defining the scope of the duty owed is
consistent with the approach adopted by the Utah Supreme Court
regarding an analogous issue under the comparative fault statute.
In Hale v. Beckstead, 2005 UT 24, 116 P.3d 263, the Utah Supreme
Court considered whether the "open and obvious" defense to a tort
action brought against a landowner had survived Utah's adoption
of comparative fault. See id. at ^ 7 - 3 1 . The plaintiff in
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Beckstead was injured when he fell from a balcony while painting
a home being built for the defendant. See id. at 1(3. Because
the home was still under construction, the railing on the balcony
had not yet been installed. See id. The trial court granted
summary judgment in favor of the defendant on the grounds that
the danger was open and obvious, completely barring the
plaintiff's recovery. See id. at f 4 . This court affirmed, and
Hale appealed to the Utah Supreme Court, see id. at fi|5-6, on the
ground that the application of the open and obvious doctrine
"contravened comparative fault principles," id. at Ul2.
f22 The Utah Supreme Court agreed that the Utah Legislature "has
necessarily disavowed any tort theory of recovery inconsistent
with comparative fault apportionment principles," including the
doctrine of assumption of risk. Id. at 1(21. Nevertheless, the
court determined that the Restatement (Second) of Torts version
of the open and obvious doctrine was still relevant to the issue
of the scope of the duty owed. See id. at ^}23 (stating that the
open and obvious rule "is a duty-defining rule that simply states
that, under appropriate circumstances, a landowner's duty of care
might not include warning or otherwise protecting visitors from
obvious dangers"). Acknowledging that there is a subtle
distinction between excusing negligence upon a defense of
assumption of risk and narrowly defining the duty of care so that
the conduct is not negligent, the court explained the importance
of that difference: "Where there is no duty, there is no fault
to compare or distribute under the comparative fault scheme."
Id. at H24. Thus, the Hale court affirmed the application of the
open and obvious doctrine to define the scope of the duty owed by
the defendant to the plaintiff, but reversed and remanded the
entry of summary judgment because of disputed material facts.
See id. at ^[39-40. We believe a narrow scope of duty is also
appropriate here, and that the doctrine of assumption of risk is
a duty-defining rule under the facts of this case.
IV.

The Element of Causation

f2 3 The Utah Supreme Court undertook a similar analysis to
define the limits of contributory negligence in comparing fault
among tortfeasors in Steiner Corp. v. Johnson & Higgins of
California, 2000 UT 21, 996 P.2d 531 (Steiner II). In that case,
however, the court focused on the absence of the element of
causation. See id. at ^ 7 . Steiner Corporation (Steiner) brought
a professional malpractice action against Johnson & Higgins of
California (J&H), claiming that J&H had negligently structured
the Steiner employee retirement plan. See id. at 1|2 . Steiner
established a plan that allowed retiring employees to choose
between one lump sum payment or the payment of a fixed amount per
month. See Steiner Corp. v. Johnson & Higgins of Cal., 135 F.3d
684, 686 (10th Cir. 1998) (Steiner I) (providing, as noted by the
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Steiner II court, a more complete statement of the facts of the
case). The formula developed by Steiner to calculate the lump
sum payment resulted in that option being more valuable than the
monthly payments. See id. As a result, most retirees selected
the lump sum option. See id.
f24 Subsequently, Steiner retained J&H as the actuary for the
plan. See id. Although more employees opted for the lump sum
payment at retirement, J&H calculated the valuation of the plan
each year on the assumption that retirees would choose the
monthly payment option. See id. In the mid-1980s, Congress
passed new legislation that required the plan to be amended by a
specific deadline so that it contained ,!a single formula for
calculating optional benefits." Id. (quotations and citation
omitted). Although Steiner asked repeatedly for a comparison of
the accrued benefits based on the lump sum and monthly payment
options, J&H never provided that information. See id. at 686-87.
Instead, J&H amended the plan documents by incorporating the old
formula for lump sum payments. See id. at 687. Upon learning of
the significant difference between the two calculation methods
after the statutory deadline, Steiner further amended the plan to
substitute a lump sum formula equivalent to the alternative
monthly distribution. See id. The delay in making the change,
however, resulted in substantial losses to Steiner because the
revised formula could only be applied to prospective calculations
of benefits. See id.
f25 Steiner sued J&H in the United States District Court for the
District of Utah for professional malpractice, and J&H asserted a
defense that Steiner f s own negligence was the cause of its
injury. See id. at 685. The United States District Court for
the District of Utah certified two questions to the Utah Supreme
Court:
(1) whether, under Utah law, the negligent
acts of a plaintiff in causing or
contributing to the situation that the
plaintiff hired a professional to resolve can
be the basis for a comparative or
contributory negligence defense, and (2)
whether, under Utah law, a plaintiff's
negligent acts in causing or contributing to
the situation the plaintiff hired a
professional to resolve can be considered in
determining causation and damages.
Steiner II, 2000 UT 21 at ^|l.
both questions 'no.'" Id. In
Steiner II court distinguished
negligence that required it to
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client's subsequent negligence that actually interfered with the
professional's performance of its duties. See id. at f6 ("[A]
plaintiff's negligence in injuring himself could not be
contributory negligence because it was not simultaneous[] with or
co-operating with the fault for which the plaintiff sought
recovery." (final alteration in original) (quotations and
citation omitted)). Although the issue was considered in the
context of contributory negligence, it provides some guidance to
the question before us.
H26 The Steiner II court concluded that the element of causation
could not be established where the negligence of the plaintiff
occurred before the professional was engaged:
[W]e conclude that a preexisting condition
that a professional is called upon to resolve
cannot be the cause, either proximate or
direct, of the professional's failure to
exercise an appropriate standard of care in
fulfilling his duties. To decide otherwise
would allow professionals to avoid
responsibility for the very duties they
undertake to perform. A doctor, for example,
might be able to avoid liability for
negligently treating an injured person
because the patient negligently had run a
traffic light and was injured. Such a result
would be clearly unsound.
Id. at 17. 3
1(27 Because the acts of Steiner preceded the engagement of J&H,
the Steiner II court held that it did not relate to the injury.
See id. at Ull. Without such a causal connection, the
plaintiff's prior negligence could not be considered under Utah's
comparative fault analysis. See id. at ^ 1 2 - 1 4 . The causation
element here is also affected by the sequence of events. While
it is true that "but for" Oldroyd's accident Fordham would not

3

We are cognizant of the difference between the blameless
officer here and the defendant in Steiner II that was defending
against a claim of professional malpractice. The rationale for
preventing a professional from asserting a contributory
negligence claim on the basis of the negligence that created the
circumstances which necessitated the professional's engagement is
admittedly more compelling. The focus on the timing of acts of
negligence for purposes of evaluating the causation element of
negligence, however, is instructive.
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have been present at the scene, the direct cause of his injuries
was the separate and subsequent act of a third party.
1J28 Fordham has already recovered from the driver who actually
struck him. Thus, we are faced solely with the question of
whether members of the public have a duty not to require, as the
result of negligence, highway assistance from police officers.
In Berko v. Freda, 459 A.2d 663 (N.J. 1983), the New Jersey
Supreme Court explained that police officers and firefighters
have a unique role:
Governmental entities maintain police and
fire departments in anticipation of those
inevitable physical perils that burden the
human condition, whereas most public
employment posts are created not to confront
dangers that will arise but to perform some
other public function that may incidentally
involve risk. . . .

This fundamental concept rests on the
assumption that governmental entities employ
firefighters and police officers, at least in
part, to deal with the hazards that may
result from their taxpayers' own future acts
of negligence. Exposing the negligent
taxpayer to liability for having summoned the
police would impose upon him multiple burdens
for that protection.
Id. at 666 (citations omitted); see also Moody v. Delta W., Inc.,
38 P.3d 1139, 1141 (Alaska 2002); Pottebaum v. Hinds, 347 N.W.2d
642, 645 (Iowa 1984); Gould v. George Brox, Inc., 623 A.2d 1325,
1328-29 (N.H. 1993) .
i[2 9 We agree that police officers are employed for the very
purpose of responding to emergency situations and that it would
be contrary to concepts of public policy to impose a duty on
citizens not to need such services. In addition, "because
negligence is at the root of many calls for public safety
officers, allowing recovery would compound the growth of
litigation," Moody, 38 P.3d at 1142, which we believe is also
against public policy. We do not believe it would be desirable
for a police officer struck by a drunk driver while issuing a
speeding ticket to be able to pursue an action against the
speeder simply because he is not made whole by the recovery from
the intoxicated driver.
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1f30 Although Oldroyd's accident brought Fordham to the scene, it
was the impact from the third-party vehicle that was the direct
cause of Fordham's injuries. See Gould, 623 A.2d at 1328 ("The
plaintiff responded to the scene to control traffic and was not
injured while responding in his professional capacity to the very
type of situation for which he was paid and trained to cope, but
rather by the subsequent and independent negligence of [a third
party]." (quotations and citation omitted))/ Berko, 459 A.2d at
665 ("Case law draws a distinction between injuries stemming from
the negligence that brought the firefighters or police to the
scene in the first place and injuries suffered from independent
causes that may follow."). "Thus[,] a police officer who while
placing a ticket on an illegally parked car is struck by a
speeding vehicle may maintain action against the speeder but the
rule bars recovery against the owner of the parked car for
negligent parking." Walters v. Sloan, 571 P.2d 609, 611 n.2
(Cal. 1977) .
i[31 In reaching the conclusion that the professional-rescuer
doctrine bars Fordham's claim against Oldroyd, we emphasize the
doctrine's narrowness; it "bars only recovery for the negligence
that creates the need for the public safety officer's service."
Moody, 38 P.3d at 1141. Therefore, the professional-rescuer
doctrine "does not apply to negligent conduct occurring after the
police officer or firefighter arrives at the scene or to
misconduct other than that which necessitates the officer's
presence." Id.; see also 8 Am. Jur. 2d Automobiles & Highway
Traffic § 691 (1997) (" [T]he fireman's rule is not a bar to a
police officer's claim for injuries sustained in the course of
his response to an accident scene where such injuries are the
result of independent acts of negligence which have no connection
with the cause of the officer's presence at the scene."); 6
Personal Injury, Buildings, Business Establishments & Private
Property § 1.10 [1] [a] (Jerome Nates et al. eds., 2004) ("Most
courts consider that the fireman's rule is of limited scope.
That is, while they view the rule as barring recovery for the
negligent act which caused public officers to be present in their
official capacity, they permit recovery for any unrelated acts of
negligence." (footnote omitted)).
^32 As
Oldroyd
brought
party.
barring
rescuer

in the cases cited above, Fordham seeks to recover from
simply because Oldroyd's prior act of alleged negligence
Fordham to the location where he was struck by a third
We hold that public policy supports a bright-line rule
such actions, and therefore, we adopt the professionaldoctrine under the facts of this case.
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CONCLUSION
K33 In circumstances like those present here, where a police
officer called to the scene of an accident is injured by a third
party, the professional-rescuer doctrine bars a claim by that
officer against the person whose negligence resulted in the
officer's presence at the scene. We affirm the trial court's
grant of Oldroyd's motion for summary judgement.

Carolyn B. McHugh, Judge

H34

WE CONCUR:

Judith M. Billings, Judge

James Z. Davis, Judge
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